Uche Cecil Izuora
Experts have warned that if the Gulf exports is materially disrupted for an extended period, the world could temporarily lose close to one fifth of globally traded oil supply.
They also stated that even partial rerouting would likely fail to offset the disruption fully.
The consequences would extend well beyond energy markets as inflation could accelerate sharply, transportation and aviation systems would face mounting fuel pressure, and fuel-importing economies could face significant financial stress.
Altogether, the Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) shortages could simultaneously increase power reliability risks across Asia and Europe.
The broader issue is that the global energy system has become highly optimized for efficiency rather than resilience, according to Oil and Gas 360 report.
That structure works during stable periods. It becomes increasingly vulnerable during prolonged geopolitical disruptions.
Oil markets still appear to assume diplomacy or de-escalation will eventually normalize flows. That remains possible. But every additional month of disruption reduces inventories, increases costs, and narrows the system’s margin for error.
The world still produces substantial amounts of oil, but can enough of it continue moving reliably if the conflict persists.
That distinction may ultimately determine whether this becomes another volatile energy episode, or a much larger global supply crisis.
The longer the Iran war continues, the less this looks like a temporary geopolitical disruption and the more it resembles the early stages of a structural oil supply crisis.
For months, markets have focused on headlines surrounding ceasefires, diplomacy, and tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. But beneath the volatility, the global oil system is steadily losing flexibility. Inventories are tightening, shipping risks remain elevated, and one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints continues operating under unstable conditions.
The issue is no longer whether disruption exists. It already does.
The question is how far the disruption spreads if the conflict continues.
The most immediate risk remains the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil supply normally flows. Even without a full closure, delays, rerouting, insurance costs, and intermittent restrictions are reducing effective supply and tightening markets globally.
The first and most likely scenario is prolonged “managed disruption,” where the Strait remains technically open but continues operating inefficiently and unpredictably. Under that environment, oil still moves, but at higher cost and lower reliability. Asian importers such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea would likely absorb the largest impact first given their dependence on Gulf crude exports.
In this scenario, prices remain structurally elevated while inventories continue declining. Shortages would likely emerge unevenly across refined products, particularly diesel, jet fuel, and petrochemical feedstocks.
A more severe scenario involves broader infrastructure disruption across Gulf production and export systems.
Several Gulf producers have already shifted exports to alternative routes, but those systems have limited capacity. Additional strikes targeting pipelines, export terminals, LNG facilities, or processing infrastructure could remove millions of barrels per day from global supply for extended periods.
The market’s vulnerability is amplified by years of underinvestment in upstream production, refining, and infrastructure redundancy. Commercial inventories are already tightening in several regions, while strategic reserves remain finite.
Under this scenario, oil prices could remain well above $120 to $150 per barrel for sustained periods, with downstream fuel shortages spreading more rapidly than crude supply losses themselves.
The most extreme scenario would involve a prolonged hard closure or near closure of Hormuz combined with broader regional escalation.